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Abstract:   
Modern health data practices come with many practical uncertainties. In this paper I argue 
that data subjects’ trust in the institutions and organizations that control their data, and 
their ability to know their own moral obligations in relation to their data, are undermined by 
significant uncertainties regarding the what, how, and who of mass data collection and 
analysis. I conclude by considering how proposals for managing situations of high 
uncertainty might be applied to this problem. These emphasize increasing organizational 
flexibility, knowledge, and capacity, and reducing hazard.  
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I. Uncertainty and data ethics 
 
Modern mass data collection and analysis promise great innovation in the 
health domain, as well as significant uncertainty. The CEO of one of the world’s 
largest technology companies has said that “fear of data-mining” leads to 
100,000 preventable deaths per year (Hern 2014). One plausible explanation 
for such fear is that health data subjects feel uncertain about the implications 
of data innovation.  
 
In this chapter the uncertainty surrounding emerging technologies is analyzed 
as a practical problem for data subjects. The style of ethical analysis employed 
here is somewhat new. Brey writes that “the main problem for the ethics of 
emerging technology is the problem of uncertainty”; however, in contrast to 
the present approach, he proposes “anticipatory technology ethics that tries to 
forecast various possible future developments” (Brey 2017, 175, 178). The 
analysis in this chapter is complementary to such an “anticipatory ethics” but 
does not aim to forecast future developments. Instead, it looks at the causes 
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and practical consequences of uncertainty for data subjects in the present 
tense.1 
Some rough definitions of key concepts are needed for this analysis. Practical 
uncertainties are defined as things we do not know and have an interest in 
knowing (Goldman 1999; Fallis 2006). Their ethical significance therefore has 
two dimensions: (a) the features of data practices that create unknowns; and 
(b) the interests of data subjects that are impeded by these unknowns.  
Data subjects refers to those people whose data is collected and processed, 
whether they provide this data voluntarily or not. For example, a person who 
gives access to genetic test results or uses ‘wearable’ or in-home medical data-
collecting devices, or consumer smartphones with built-in health services is a 
data subject. In cases where people provide highly explicit and voluntary 
consent to the transfer of data, we can speak of donation. However, in what 
follows it will be argued that within the context of current data practices it is 
often unclear whether a data transfer can really count as a donation, because 
whether it is truly a donation is itself a morally significant uncertainty. 
 
The argument here concerns health data but is also relevant for many other 
domains where personal data is shared and collected on a mass scale, such as 
social media, financial planning, workplaces, and urban spaces. The boundaries 
between health data and other kinds of personal data are blurring to some 
extent: “The traditional boundaries of primary and tertiary care environments 
are breaking down and health information is increasingly collected through 
mobile devices, in personal domains … and from sensors attached on or in the 
human body…. At the same time, the detail and diversity of information 
collected in the context of healthcare and biomedical research is increasing at 
an unprecedented rate” (Malin et al. 2013, 2). An extension of this point is that 
a great deal of not-seemingly-health-related data can be used for medical and 
health purposes (Prainsack 2017).  
In accordance with the definition of practical uncertainty above, the argument 
to be pursued here can be expressed in the following way:  
1. Fundamental features of our data practices, including the open-
endedness of data to new insights and applications, the opacity of data 
analysis (here referring to the inaccessibility and/or incomprehensibility 
                                                 
1 In this sense, my approach is what Brey would label a “generic approach” to the ethics of emerging 
technology that considers “inherent features of the technology” rather than an “anticipatory approach” that 
uses “foresight methods” (op. cit., 178-179). However, it analyzes uncertainties about the future. 
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of how algorithms analyze data), and the persistence of data, imply 
uncertainty regarding the what, how, and who of data practices.  
2. Two important epistemic interests of data subjects are threatened by 
this uncertainty: (i) having trust in the institutions that manage data, and 
(ii) knowing one’s ethical obligations with respect to data sharing. 
3. Therefore, other things equal, we should take feasible policy measures 
to mitigate uncertainty.  
In line with this argument, Section II discusses some endemic aspects of our 
data practices that create uncertainties, and Section III addresses our interests 
in having knowledge in the domain of health data. Section IV concerns possible 
strategies for mitigating uncertainty. Such strategies, if effective, could make it 
less ethically problematic to obtain the many benefits associated with mass 
data collection and analysis, and could help people overcome the “fear of data 
mining” mentioned at the beginning of this section. 
 
 
II. What features of data practices create unknowns? 
 
Three features of data and data practices — open-endedness, opacity, and 
persistence — together give rise to significant uncertainties for data subjects. 
These uncertainties are distinctive because they cannot easily be avoided by 
engaging in best practices for risk reduction (for example, through better data 
security). To some extent they are part and parcel of any scenario for mass 
collection and processing of data. They are not futuristic. They are implied by 
many practitioners’ statements about current practices, both routine and 
avant-garde, as well as in current interpretation of these practices. Those 
familiar with data ethics might find the features of data practices discussed in 
what follows unsurprising. What is new here is how they are conceptualized 
and deployed in relation to uncertainty. The focus is on uncertainties that 
arise, not when something goes wrong with the management of data, but 
rather when it is being used as its controllers intend: uncertainties due to the 
very nature of digital data as a form of information and our practices of using 
it.2 
 
                                                 
2 Collingridge (1980) is famous for arguing that we can only control the risks of technological innovation early 
in its development, but we can only know what risks to try to prevent after it is well underway. The 
uncertainties I focus on here cannot easily be prevented for another reason, which is that they are almost 
inseparable from the underlying data practices, strongly linked with the transformative potential of those 
practices, and therefore not likely to be eliminated. 
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Before exploring these three uncertainty-creating characteristics of modern 
data practices, a brief remark is needed about what uncertainty means here. In 
practical ethics we are often concerned with risky uncertainties: possible, 
unwanted future states of affairs (e.g., possible data thefts). Risk and 
uncertainty are often defined so that they refer to distinct phenomena: ‘risk 
proper’ is probabilistic uncertainty about future unwanted events where both 
the probabilities and the possible outcomes of these events are known and 
quantifiable, whereas ‘uncertainty proper’ is a lack of knowledge about which 
outcomes are possible and/or their probabilities (Knight 1921; cf. Altham 
1983). Some authors draw a further distinction between uncertainty and 
ignorance, where ignorance involves inability to predict outcomes or plausible 
scenarios (Wynne 1992, cited in Dereli et al. 2014). The kind of uncertainty to 
be discussed in what follows lies in between the categories of uncertainty 
proper and ignorance: we can identify some plausible horizons of possibility, 
but not exhaustively or quantifiably.3  
 
Open-endedness 
 
Open-endedness — the potential for creating and applying data-based 
knowledge in new ways — creates significant uncertainties for data subjects at 
the time when their data is collected and afterwards. Data is multiply 
interpretable, especially when combined and used for new purposes. Different 
algorithms and analytical lenses, such as different strategies of classifying, 
combining, and finding patterns in data, allow for new predictions and 
correlative generalizations. This is essential to the promises of data collection 
and analysis: “the value of big data lies in the unexpectedness of the insights 
that it can reveal” (Barocas & Nissenbaum 2014, 60). Since we cannot form 
expectations about these important insights, open-endedness creates 
significant uncertainties. 
 
There are at least two dimensions of open-endedness. The first is the fecundity 
of inferences that can be drawn when a dataset is larger or better organized, 
or where more powerful analytical tools are used. The second is 
recontextualization of data across contexts. We can think of the first dimension 
                                                 
3 Consequences known to be harmful for some individuals are likely to be directly caused by the further 
development of big data practices, such as the ability to reidentify unidentified (“anonymous”) data subjects 
using new and more powerful analytical techniques. This could in some cases lead to loss of insurance or other 
harms for re-identified individuals. For example, in Lippert et al.’s (2017) controversial study, recognizable 
images of the faces of individuals were said to be reconstructable using data from gene sequences. There is 
dispute about whether the results really prove what the authors say (Erlich 2017). Irrespective of this dispute, 
my point here is that the looming possibility of such techniques creates horizons of uncertainty that exist long 
before any future harms that result. These uncertainties are ethically significant in their own right. 
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as the depth or power of the inferences we can make from a set of data, and 
the second dimension as the practical applicability of these inferences in a 
diverse range of contexts in real time.4 
 
A real-life example of open-endedness from the health domain is the vision of 
the ‘value-based health care’ movement. This movement proposes to align 
payment for health services closely with actual health outcomes, creating a 
transformation of health care. Its founders have maintained from the 
beginning that data collection and analysis are necessary instruments for this 
transition because they make it possible to develop and apply a nuanced 
health-improvement metric for reimbursing health costs across the board. One 
early proponent, focusing on the inefficiencies of the American health care 
system, devotes several paragraphs to the importance of data as a means 
toward value-based care:  
 
Measurement and dissemination of health outcomes should become 
mandatory for every provider and every medical condition … We need to 
measure true health outcomes rather than relying solely on process 
measures, such as compliance with practice guidelines, which are 
incomplete and slow to change. … Among our highest near-term 
priorities is to finalize and then continuously update health information 
technology (HIT) standards that include precise data definitions (for 
diagnoses and treatments, for example), an architecture for aggregating 
data for each patient over time and across providers, and protocols for 
seamless communication among systems (Porter 2009). 
  
This underlying idea has persisted both in value-based health care and in other 
similar movements such as the Institute of Medicine’s ‘learning health care 
system’: with new sources of data and analytical tools, we can explore new 
ways of modeling and addressing the causes of inefficiency and suboptimal 
health outcomes (Committee 2013; Mulley et al. 2017). Both fecundity of 
insight and recontextualization of real-time decision-making are needed for 
the envisioned transformations. 
 
Other examples emphasize recontextualization to a greater degree: cases in 
which an integrated situational awareness is stitched together from data 
originating in multiple contexts, creating a single ‘dashboard’ or ‘visualization’ 
                                                 
4 Some commentators have raised epistemological concerns that big data is overhyped as a scientific field and 
may not withstand scientific scrutiny of its knowledge claims (Mittelstadt & Floridi 2016, Lipworth et al. 2017). 
My argument does not depend on the validity of the relevant knowledge claims as a whole, but rather their 
plausibility. 
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for decision-making. Suppose two large sets of data on treatments, costs, and 
patient outcomes, one collected by hospitals, and a second collected by 
general practitioners, are being combined for the first time. If health care is 
managed through substantially separate structures, then mutual access to this 
information holds the prospect of bringing about better integration and 
continuity of health care for both hospitals and GPs (e.g., Sheaff et al. 2015, 
57). Similar contextual awareness is anticipated elsewhere in health care: for 
example, in the integration of “informal health and fitness data collected by 
the user together with official health records collected by health professionals” 
(Gay & Leijdekkers 2015). These cases stress the recontextualization of 
information, but also promise insight when complementary data is combined. 
 
Profiling people in multiple and unpredictable ways is an ethically relevant 
aspect of open-endedness in data analysis. Profiling has been defined as “the 
process of ‘discovering’ patterns in data … that can be used to identify or 
represent a human or nonhuman subject (individual or group) and/or the 
application of profiles (sets of correlated data) to individuate and represent an 
individual subject or to identify a subject as a member of a group (which can be 
an existing community or a discovered category)” (Hildebrandt 2009, 275). This 
and other definitions explicitly relate to both dimensions of open-endedness: 
fecundity (“discovering”) and recontextualization (“application”, 
“identification”). Profiling is particularly relevant to data subjects in a health 
context because it has the potential to classify them for diagnosis, treatment, 
and reimbursement in unpredictable ways. For example, it might be used as a 
reason to choose a particular diagnostic, or to deny treatment altogether. 
 
Opacity  
 
A second source of endemic uncertainty in our data practices is the use of 
opaque algorithms and ‘deep learning’ to analyze data (Kennedy et al., 2015; 
Rieder & Simon 2017). Consider a widely discussed recent example in which a 
deep learning algorithm was trained to identify profile photos from a 
prominent social media site as being gay/ lesbian or straight (Wang & Kosinski 
2018). The algorithm was able to determine this with considerable accuracy, 
better than that of human raters. However, because the training was 
automatic and data-driven, it is not known what features the machine 
correlated with sexual orientation identity.   
 
This example shows that one possible reason why data analytics is opaque is 
that deep learning techniques do not disclose the underlying pattern of their 
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learning (Mittelstadt et al. 2016). Some algorithms are highly complex, and 
some are modified frequently (Rieder & Simon 2017, 6). However, not all 
algorithms are complex or difficult to understand; there are also other reasons 
why data analytics is opaque. One is secrecy: algorithms are often not shared 
due to intellectual property issues, competitiveness, inertia, or concerns that 
they will not withstand scrutiny (Burrell 2016; Christophersen et al. 2015; 
Gillingham 2016; Stodden 2010).  
 
A complicating issue is that data subjects rarely have the concepts needed to 
understand the actual algorithms and deep learning techniques themselves.  
However, that is not in itself an epistemological barrier to knowledge. On many 
views of knowledge in a social world, it is socially constituted. Laypeople can 
have knowledge that is partly constituted by the knowledge and understanding 
of others, including experts (Faulkner 2011, Goldberg 2010). A serious problem 
arises principally when experts do not have this knowledge themselves, or 
when they do not carry out their functions in a way that confers socially 
constituted knowledge upon data subjects. For example, a plausible condition 
on socially constituted knowledge is that there is some person or collective of 
persons that has understanding and is willing and able to provide an articulate 
explanation when asked or challenged.5 When trained scientists working with 
opaque algorithms do not understand or show willingness to articulate how 
conclusions are being derived through data analysis, this condition fails. This 
creates significant uncertainty about how data analysis is applied to health 
data now, and especially about how it could be applied in the future. 
 
Persistence  
 
Data is long-lived and duplicable; here I call the combination of these two 
features persistence. Unlike most collections of physical biological materials 
used for scientific and therapeutic purposes, once a collection of health data is 
gathered it is feasible to preserve it indefinitely and give access to it prolifically. 
For physical biological materials, this necessitates storage and, in cases of cell 
cultures, in vitro reproductive techniques. For health data on a large scale, this 
necessitates computer storage and various means of sharing or giving access to 
large amounts of data.6 Because it is quite feasible to store, copy, and access 
                                                 
5 Here my analysis differs from Burrell’s (2016) in that I do not regard widespread “technical illiteracy” about 
data analysis as a basic form of opacity.  Ordinary people can unproblematically obtain “second-hand 
knowledge” from experts in many domains, even when they are technically illiterate. 
6 Collections of biomedical samples or ‘biobanks’ are always associated with data, and especially where 
population-level biobanks are concerned this data component is just as important as the ‘wet’ biological 
component (as in the definition of the Council of Europe 2006). 
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data at a “medium” scale (i.e., well below the limits of Moore’s law), this leads 
to a potential for reproductive profligacy of health data that extends 
indefinitely into the future.   
 
Persistence is a relevant source of ignorance for the data subject because 
many different institutions and organizations with different interests and 
motivations store, share, and analyze data. Vayena & Blasimme describe a 
“data ecosystem” with an “increasing number of stakeholders” including “the 
data analytics industry ... [and] social media giants … [that] enter the domain of 
health bringing corporate cultures that are not necessarily aligned with existing 
regulations in health research” (2018, 121). Commercial organizations and 
governmental and academic institutions often cooperate in data-intensive 
projects, and the boundaries of data (access) are often not limited by 
institutional, regional, or national boundaries. Data about a person from one 
context or jurisdiction can be copied multiple times and shared with many 
different kinds of entities in different contexts or jurisdictions, with different 
motives (profit, surveillance, efficiency). Moreover, the results of data analysis, 
such as the results of profiling, become data entities of their own, which also 
share these features of longevity and shareability and can be distributed and 
reused for new purposes. In combination, these factors imply that multiple 
entities and types of entities (e.g., commercial entities, research entities) are 
likely to control one's personal health data in the long term, and that data 
profiles concerning data subjects are likely be generated which endure and are 
shared across contexts and jurisdictions.7  
 
A figure (Figure 1) helps to visualize this as a source of uncertainty.  The lines, 
starting at T0, represent the lifespan of the data. The solid lines are those parts 
of the lifespan under the intentional control of the original recipient or 
collector of data. The dashed lines represent the parts of the lifespan that are 
not under the intentional control of the original recipient or controller of data.  
These dashed lines are particularly uncertainty-inducing because they are no 
longer governed by the same assumptions that the data subject might have 
reasonably made at T0 about the motives and interests of the entities 
possessing the data. The lines (both solid and dashed) can branch, of course, 
because parts of the data can be given away or duplicated. In addition, new 
branches, consisting of analyzed data or profiling data based on the original 
                                                 
7 Deidentification of original data shared by data subjects does not prevent those subjects from being targeted 
in a way that resembles profiling. For example, data from patients at a particular medical practice can be 
deidentified and used to make generalizations about the practice, which are then used to target those very 
patients.   
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data but not identical to it, can start independently. These are represented as 
solid or dashed lines starting at times after T0. 
 
 
Figure 1. The persistence of personal data 
 
 
Endemic uncertainties combined 
 
The open-endedness, opacity, and persistence of data and data practices 
together create a host of unknowns for data subjects. Such unknowns include: 
how collected data about the subject will be combined in the future, how the 
combined data will be used to measure, classify, and profile the subject, and 
what implications new metrics and regimes of access to information will have 
for the subject. We can think of these as unknown knowns: they are forms of 
knowledge and knowledge-based power that will come into being in the future 
but are currently unpredictable and unknown.8 
 
 
                                                 
8 Slavoj Žižek introduced this term in relation to former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s infamous 
speech about ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’, in order to refer to things one does know, but 
does not realize or admit that they know (2004). It was later used as the title of a film about Rumsfeld by 
director Errol Morris. My use of the term departs from these earlier uses. 
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III. Two epistemic interests of data subjects 
 
In section I, practical uncertainty is defined as matters that we do not know 
and have an interest in knowing. We have so far been focusing on those 
aspects of our data practices which create unknowns. Now let us turn our 
attention to the second part of the definition, which refers to the interests we 
have in understanding and knowing.9 In what follows I focus on two high-
priority interests that are particularly impacted by the unknowns discussed in 
the previous section: one’s ability as a potential data subject to trust others 
with one’s data, and one’s ability to determine one’s own moral obligations in 
relation to oneself and others where data issues are concerned. For each of 
these interests, I begin by presenting a case in which the relevant interest is 
intuitively present. 
 
A. Interests in trust  
 
SHARA   
Shara is considering going to a hospital because she believes she may 
have been exposed to HIV in a sexual encounter (although she believes 
the risk is very low). She believes she could obtain a prescription for 
post-exposure HIV prophylaxis. However, she is not sure of the 
implications of trusting the hospital or the pharmacy with these ‘data 
points’.  
 
Can Shara trust the hospital and other relevant institutions with her data? 
Considering the uncertainties associated with institutional data practices, it 
might be rational for Shara to make a strategic assessment of whether the risk 
of HIV infection makes it worth visiting the hospital under these circumstances. 
She does not know who will come to possess her data in the future, how they 
will analyze it, and for what purposes. For all she knows, she could be profiled 
as being high-risk and denied service or offered different care in the future. 
From the perspective of individual rational choice, if not from the perspective 
of public health (Ford et al. 2015), such uncertainty could tip the balance in 
favor of not seeking treatment. This is an urgent epistemic and practical 
problem for Shara. 
                                                 
9 Two main senses of ‘interest’ are operating here in a way that is mutually reinforcing: something can be in my 
interest to know, or it can be interesting, or both. I use the term ‘interests,’ rather than ‘rights’ or ‘needs,’ 
because the latter terms presuppose that epistemic concerns are so strong as to be ethically overriding (i.e., to 
serve as ‘trumps’ over other values). I think it will be clear that the interests in question are sometimes 
sufficiently weighty to override other values or interests, but this need not always be the case. 
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As this example illustrates, one weighty epistemic interest of data subjects is to 
have sufficient reason to trust entities such as governments, corporations, 
research institutions, and hospitals with data. Data practitioners and scholars 
have remarked upon this interest in trust, particularly in the health (care) 
domain, where trust is a bedrock value (Larson 2013; Lipworth et al. 2017). Our 
attitudes about the social, political, and technological world depend on trust. 
Trust frames how we think of our prospects for cooperation, and the 
responsibilities of others. 
 
Trust involves a complex of predictive and normative expectations based on 
the interests, motives, and past performance of the trusted entity (Voerman & 
Nickel 2017). With a few notable exceptions (Hardin 2006), many scholars, 
including some philosophers, take for granted that one can trust institutions 
(Hawley 2017). We can hold this kind of trust towards specific organizations 
(such as Harvard University or the NHS) and various functional human roles 
within them (e.g., the role of data scientist or clinical researcher). Trust in 
institutions is based on our ideas of the norms and functional aims that govern 
and define organizations and the roles within them, in addition to individual 
characteristics such as goodwill or moral character that ground person-to-
person trust (Baier 1986, Holton 1994). Trust in institutions is distinctive in that 
it does not normally involve the expectation that the trusted entities will be 
specifically responsive to the trust one places in them. In this respect, it differs 
from trust between intimates (Faulkner 2011). 
 
People’s interest in trust is not merely to have trust, but to have it in the right 
circumstances and for the right reasons. Normally, this aspect of trust is 
backed by having a reliable grasp of the interests, functions, and norms that 
motivate and explain the trusted entity’s behavior. This idea of a reliable grasp 
can be cashed out in more ‘internalist’ or ‘externalist’ ways. Internalism means 
that one’s warrant for trust consists primarily of items to which one has “direct 
and unproblematic access” (Bonjour & Sosa 2003); externalism means that it 
can also substantially consist of items in one’s social or physical environment 
to which one does not have access. Manson & O’Neill (2007) put forward an 
ideal of ‘intelligent trust’ that emphasizes the virtues or talents of an individual 
truster in making good choices about whom to trust. Others advance a notion 
of ‘healthy trust’ or ‘sound trust’ that emphasizes the importance of the 
environment as well as the individual in creating the conditions for 
epistemically grounded and non-exploitative trust (Boenink 2003, Voerman & 
Nickel 2017). Loosely speaking, the first account emphasizes the internal 
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aspects of warranted trust, and the second account emphasizes the external 
aspects. (However, the notion of “intelligent trust” could also be given an 
externalist interpretation, as Sosa does for the idea of intellectual virtues more 
generally (Bonjour & Sosa 2003).) Either way, intelligent or healthy trust 
depends on a stable, reliable ascription of norms and functional aims to the 
institutions we rely on. 
 
The endemic uncertainties of our data practices, explicated in the previous 
section, threaten this epistemic basis for trust. They make it very difficult to 
have a stable, reliable grasp of norms and functions of the entities we rely on, 
or even to determine which entities are actually involved. Uncertainties about 
what kinds of organizations and institutions will come to possess one’s data in 
the future, and about how data might be used for profiling, make it difficult to 
trust because such uncertainties threaten the warrant for trust. A data subject 
may reasonably wonder whether the new metrics of value-based health care 
might in the future be used to profile her (perhaps using an opaque algorithm) 
as being a poor prospect for health outcomes, or whether her data will be 
transferred to new entities whose motives and interests oppose her own. 
When such scenarios cannot be defined, the epistemic grounding for trust in 
health care institutions is missing. The ‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘who’ of trust cannot 
be specified.  
 
Brown & Calnan (2012) have analyzed situations like Shara’s in which there is a 
high degree of uncertainty and institutional complexity in clinical contexts, in 
terms of trust. They argue that trust becomes an explicit problem in such 
contexts because its rational basis is threatened (ibid., 4). However, trust 
remains salient as a possible way of “bridging” uncertainty (ibid., 53ff.). I follow 
their analysis when looking at data practices. Trust remains a possible strategy 
for navigating situations that arise in the midst of those practices, even when 
the uncertainties surrounding our data practices threaten and undermine its 
familiar epistemic foundation. However, such a strategy is like the Biblical 
house built on sand, whose foundation is unstable. It can be occupied, but 
existential threats to it cannot be rationally put out of one’s mind. 
 
 
B. Interests in knowing our own obligations 
 
CARLA 
Carla has recently moved to a new area. She has a serious health 
problem. When she arrives at the hospital to get medical treatment for 
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her problem, she chooses to conceal a past pregnancy and a past 
depression, preventing both events from becoming data points.  
 
Is Carla failing to act in good faith? Is she unfairly advantaging herself over 
others in order to gain access to health care, by leaving out something that is 
relevant to clinical decision-making? Or is she simply protecting her privacy 
from exploitation by commercial and research organizations she does not 
endorse? Knowing one’s obligations determinately means being able to answer 
these questions. Being morally responsible as a citizen and a member of the 
moral community seems to require such knowledge. Intuitively, knowing one’s 
own obligations determinately is an important human interest. 
 
In order to know our obligations in relation to data practices we must know 
who will have access to our data, what the data means for us, and how it will 
be used. If a patient’s data will be used to profile her for unspecified purposes 
that extend far beyond the provision of medical care or for unrelated 
commercial purposes, then it seems intuitively that an act of concealment by 
the patient does not violate any moral duty of honesty or fairness to others but 
is rather a matter of protecting her own privacy. On the other hand, if the data 
is to be protected rigorously and used only in research that could benefit 
others similar to her, and her choice to conceal data actually hinders this goal, 
then arguably she can be seen as acting dishonestly and unfairly by not 
disclosing important facts from her medical history. This creates uncertainty 
about the duties and responsibilities conferred on different parties by a data 
transfer. The status of a patient’s data transfer could be seen as a kind of 
donation, as the price of a service, or as a shared burden — a sort of tax — 
imposed for the sake of fairness and solidarity. Which of these ways of thinking 
about data transfers and their associated “deontic consequences” is the 
correct one is unclear and indeterminate in many cases.10 Intuitively, this kind 
of moral uncertainty frustrates important interests of data subjects. 
 
The linkage between uncertainty about our data practices and uncertainty 
about what obligations result from transfers of health data is implicit in 
Cohen’s (2017) argument that people have a duty to share health data as a 
matter of solidarity. The argument starts with the crucial assumption that the 
possessor of shared health data will be either a government agency or a 
hospital system “committed to improving healthcare … for the people it 
serves,” not a for-profit commercial entity (ibid., 210). When this assumption is 
reliably satisfied, we can think of health data sharing as having the status of a 
                                                 
10 Compare Tutton's (2004) discussion of how to frame the “sharing” of biological materials in biobanking. 
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reciprocal shared burden or a tax, where everybody has an obligation to 
contribute, and gratitude and specific goods and services are not expected in 
return. Conversely, though, if there is significant uncertainty about whether 
data will be used for purposes unrelated to health, for commercial purposes, 
or by new organizations and institutions, then there will also be uncertainty 
about the conclusion that people have a solidaristic obligation to share health 
data. 
 
An important corollary of the linkage between data practices and uncertainty is 
that uncertainties about data transfers challenge the very idea of data 
donation. Making a donation (i.e., gift-giving) is an act associated with other 
morally-laden acts and attitudes such as gratitude, and is not easy to combine 
with other moral regimes such as that of communitarianism and solidarity, or 
that of a commercial exchange (Herman 2012). In real practice, giving away 
data is often thought of as the price of using web-based services. Data is a kind 
of bartering chip that one uses to pay for these services. The idea of “Web 2.0” 
has been coined for a business model in which users are prosumers, who both 
produce content and data for Internet sites and applications and also consume 
— often “for free” — the valuable services that websites and apps deliver 
(Toffler 1980; Ritzer & Jurgenson 2010). Prosumption is a business model for 
many health data companies (Prainsack 2017). So long as we remain confused 
about whether a given data transfer is our contribution toward carrying a 
shared burden, as Cohen argues, or a bartering transaction, as the business 
model of prosumption implies, then it will not possible to consider that very 
transfer of data to be a pure donation at the same time.  
 
In the remainder of this section, I address a philosophical objection to the idea 
that uncertainty really threatens our epistemic interests. (Those who are not 
worried about such an objection may choose to skip to the next section.)  So 
far I have relied on the intuition that knowing our moral obligations 
determinately makes one better off. However, according to some 
philosophers, even if we do not know the outcomes of our actions 
determinately, or even the various possible ways of valuing possible outcomes, 
we can still calculate our moral meta-obligations (Lockhart 2000; Zimmerman 
2008, 38; Barry & Tomlin 2016; Lazar 2018). The underlying strategy for 
determining our meta-obligations is to consider every plausible valuation of 
different possible actions (the possible obligations about which we are 
uncertain), and then use a meta-principle to calculate one’s unique meta-
obligation given these possible valuations. For example, suppose our imaginary 
patient Carla does not know whether her data transfer would count as a 
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donation of data, a price that she pays in exchange for medical service, or a tax 
associated with the shared burden of the medical system. By taking each of 
these deontic statuses as members of a set of possible valuations V, she can 
apply a suitable meta-principle to calculate her unique actual obligation. An 
example of such a meta-principle might be, “If any of the valuations in V 
implies an obligation not to do x, then there is a meta-obligation not to do x.” 
 
This objection maintains that one’s unique obligation can be specified just as 
well for situations of significant uncertainty as it can be for situations in which 
the outcomes and valuations are certain. If our knowledge of our meta-
obligations under conditions of uncertainty is just as satisfactory, ethically and 
practically, as our knowledge of our determinate obligations, then our 
epistemic interest in knowing our obligations can be satisfied perfectly well 
even under conditions of uncertainty. This would undermine the claim that our 
epistemic interest in knowing our obligations is threatened by uncertainty 
about data practices. 
 
This is a deep objection deserving a thorough philosophical treatment. Here I 
offer three preliminary replies. The first is that there is nothing that prevents 
us from holding that situations in which it is rational to act on a meta-principle 
under moral uncertainty are situations in which we are worse off, other things 
equal, compared to situations in which it is rational to act on a determinate 
principle. The second is that, empirically, people have a strong aversion to 
uncertainty (sometimes called “ambiguity” in the relevant empirical literature), 
at least in contexts where quantifiable options are directly compared to 
ambiguous, uncertain ones (Fox & Tversky 1995). The third is that getting the 
outcome wrong will normally be more likely if an agent does not know her own 
obligations determinately, than if she does. This is true even if she acts 
blamelessly because she acted according to an appropriate meta-principle. 
Being more likely to get the outcome wrong makes her worse off even if it 
does not reflect directly on whether she is to blame. In sum, we can accept 
meta-principles for situations of moral uncertainty without giving up the 
empirically-supported intuition that moral uncertainty threatens our interests 
in an important respect. 
 
IV. Strategies for mitigating uncertainty 
Risk scholars have proposed structured guidelines for mitigating situations of 
high uncertainty, focusing on two main strategies: increasing systemic 
resilience and reducing hazard (Renn 2008). Since these strategies are well-
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established, it is useful to consider how they could be applied to the 
uncertainties surrounding data practices. Systemic resilience refers to flexibility 
and organizational capacity in monitoring and responding to ongoing hazards. 
Hazard reduction, by contrast, is a matter of limiting what is at stake in 
uncertainty. Below I attempt to identify instances of each strategy from the 
literature on data governance and consider whether they are likely to mitigate 
harms to data subjects’ epistemic interests. Doing so highlights the need for 
further research about the feasibility of such strategies, as well as the 
feasibility of supplementary strategies that more directly address the problem 
of practical uncertainty about health data. 
 
 
A. Systemic resilience through flexible systemic oversight 
First, I consider a strategy to increase systemic resilience. The General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), taking effect in the European Union in 2018, 
may appear to be such a strategy. It places new governance requirements on 
data controllers and takes steps to harmonize governance across member 
countries. It requires that people be informed when they are being profiled 
(Regulation 2016, §60), and that people can find out the “logic involved in any 
personal data processing” (§63).  
Despite these measures, one recent study finds that there is significant 
uncertainty about how the GDPR will be implemented in practice, and that 
there is likely to be a tradeoff between disruptive innovation and strict 
regulatory compliance (van den Broek & van Veenstra 2018). There are also 
other reasons why the GDPR does not solve the problem of uncertainty for 
data subjects. First, it only directly protects citizens of the EU. Second, many 
data subjects in the EU do not care about or understand the rights to know and 
to respond to data processing articulated in the GDPR, and consequently those 
rights do not protect them from uncertainty. Thirdly, even those who do care 
about their rights often give legal consent to data collection and processing 
because doing so is instrumental to obtaining services. Such acts of consent do 
not generally have the function of reducing uncertainty, as anyone who has 
clicked through an online consent form can ascertain.  
Vayena & Blasimme (2018) have put forward the idea of flexible “systemic 
oversight” to avoid tradeoffs between innovation and regulatory compliance, 
while countering the impact of uncertainty. The idea is to create a 
comprehensive framework for governance that is reflexive, inclusive, and 
responsive. Systemic oversight is meant to allow for innovation while providing 
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“adaptive and flexible mechanisms” for oversight, in which there is 
“deliberative democracy” through “collective engagement of research 
participants in decisions about data governance” (ibid., 124-125). In relation to 
uncertainty, “oversight mechanisms should not be seen as procedures for 
prospective risk assessment, but rather as adaptive instruments that respond 
to change” (ibid., 124).  
As applied to the problems discussed here, the idea is that regulatory 
processes resulting from collective, democratic processes will protect data 
subjects’ interests and thereby make the act of sharing health data more 
rational. Mechanisms of deliberation and collective engagement would also 
increase well-grounded trust (in line with the account offered above in section 
III.A), so long as an alignment of interests results that favors data subjects and 
is available to them as a warrant for trust.  
Flexible systemic oversight might be taken to mean that relative to a given 
jurisdiction and use of data, individuals could be given explicit guidance about 
their obligations and protected from the unexpected consequences of their 
choices. This could help to mitigate the effects of uncertainty about one’s data-
relative obligations. For example, within a given health care administrative 
region, the choice could be made to impose a solidaristic model of shared 
burden, in which everybody transfers data for the sake of common benefit. In 
cases where there were data leaks or unforeseen effects of profiling, a 
compensation scheme could be introduced to remedy the impacts, as 
proposed by Prainsack (2017). Such a regional choice could relieve people of 
the burden of uncertainty about their data-relative obligations. 
 
Flexibility and systematicity are potentially at odds with one another, however.  
Flexibility implies that there is temporal and local adaptation to particular 
institutional situations and innovation regimes. However, this flexibility may 
actually prevent the formation of stable expectations that simplify trust 
decisions and make one’s obligations as a data subject clear across different 
boundaries and jurisdictions. Regulation must address data that crosses the 
clinical/ non-clinical boundary, data that crosses institutional and national 
borders, and data that is commercialized or exploited within public-private 
partnerships. Flexibility and adaptability seem to imply variability. In that case, 
flexible and adaptable regulatory processes may be less effective at conveying 
to people that their interests are being consistently protected, and less 
effective at establishing a simple and clear set of obligations in respect of 
health data, compared with truly systematic (hence inflexible) regulation with 
clear-cut restrictions extending to all uses and jurisdictions. More research is 
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needed to clarify how flexibility might be balanced with systematicity, and 
what the impact will be on the expectations and obligations of data subjects. 
 
 
B. Hazard reduction through privacy-by-design 
Now I turn to a hazard reduction strategy. To begin with, it is important to note 
that it is somewhat unclear how to think about hazard reduction as applied to 
the data domain. In the domain of system safety, hazard reduction denotes the 
removal of hazardous substances and processes from a system, or their 
replacement with less hazardous substances and processes (Leveson et al. 
2009). There is no direct analogue in the domain of privacy. 
However, there are some crude parallels.  We could, for example, encourage 
data obsolescence by default, or disallow “hypercollection” (Prainsack’s (2017) 
term). Data obsolescence implies that after a certain time period, data is 
always deleted by default (it “obsolesces”), unless it has been specifically saved 
because of its demonstrable significance. Limiting hypercollection, by contrast, 
means that the default is not to collect or combine data in the first place unless 
there is a specific research motivation for doing so, such as a specific, powerful 
research question to be answered.  
Although these measures could substantially protect privacy, they would carry 
an unacceptable cost in the health domain. They would block innovation and 
cost lives. Strictly limiting data collection or encouraging data obsolescence is 
difficult or impossible to combine with transformative initiatives such as the 
value-based health care movement considered above, in which massive and 
persistent data collection and analysis is built into the paradigm. Obsolescence 
would severely limit the value of the careful work that goes into creating a 
dataset.  
 
It might be possible to think of the analogue of hazard reduction strategies in 
the domain of privacy as a broader set of measures that limit the degree to 
which personal data is threatened in the first place. Privacy-by-design is the 
name applied to strategies in which privacy safeguards are built in to a 
technology and attended to in the primary process of technology development 
and implementation, incorporating physical, technical, and procedural 
safeguards along the way.  
 
Understood in this way, privacy-by-design may be too broad and vague to 
capture the simple and obvious logic of hazard reduction, but is nonetheless 
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promising as a strategy of mitigating uncertainty. Its effectiveness will depend 
upon the specifics of the situation and the way it is carried out. An important 
point to keep in mind is that some health data innovation appears inseparably 
to depend on information that can indirectly lead back to the subject (e.g., as a 
member of a relevant class or group) or can reidentify the subject when 
combined with other data (Mittelstadt et al. 2016). 
 
 
C. Concluding Reflections 
 
Health care faces major challenges such as the difficulty of efficiently caring for 
an aging population, and the increasing incidence of chronic disease that are 
expensive to treat. Data-based innovations are one of the main ways that 
technology can help meet these challenges. Lives can be saved and improved 
by the insights gained through health data collection and analysis. At the same 
time, however, these innovations create many uncertainties for ordinary 
people. In this paper, I have argued that these uncertainties are an ethical 
problem for data subjects.  
 
An important consequence for the present chapter is that in order to see a 
given data transfer as a donation, undertaken as an act of generosity, it is not 
possible to see it at the same time as a bartering chip that one exchanges for a 
service, or as a shared burden that one undertakes out of solidarity. Resolving 
the uncertainties around our health data may therefore mean making a choice 
between seeing particular data transfers in one of these ways or another. This 
may limit the applicability of the idea of data donation. 
 
An important task of future research is to further develop the kinds of 
governance strategies discussed above so that they better address the specific 
epistemic problems for data donors and data subjects explored in this paper.  
Another is to seek complementary approaches that directly shore up trust and 
reduce the costs of not knowing one’s own obligations.  
 
Focusing on trust, for example, we might consider whether a greater emphasis 
on data professionalism could shore up trust in the face of uncertainty. 
Professionalism arises in situations where experts in some field of activity, such 
as doctors, engineers, and pharmacists, adopt formal standards for having the 
privilege of labeling themselves a certain way, and enjoy an exclusive right to 
evaluate the work of others who use the label. Professionalism is often linked 
to trust and trustworthiness (Pellegrino & Thomasma 1993; Manson & O’Neill 
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2007). The underlying idea is that the development of professions functions to 
signal trustworthiness to those with a practical need for the relevant form of 
expertise. Data science professionalism is relatively undeveloped compared 
with professionalism in other areas of science, engineering, and medicine. By 
developing it in the realm of health care data, and clearly signaling what 
standards go along with the relevant professional identity, we could create 
(and communicate) trustworthiness in this area. 
 
As for our interest in knowing our own obligations in the domain of data 
practices, a plausible first step is for health care authorities to acknowledge 
openly that there is significant uncertainty about practices of data collection 
and analysis. This is a matter of showing respect for the real difficulties that 
data subjects and potential data donors face when trying to make well 
supported and ethically responsible decisions to accept or resist sharing data, 
and may be a way to begin addressing these difficulties.11 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
11 I would like to acknowledge the useful feedback I received on earlier versions of this paper from participants 
at workshops in Eindhoven, in Warwick, and at the Oxford Internet Institute. This research is affiliated with the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research Responsible Innovation (NWO-MVI) project “Mobile Support 
Systems for Behaviour Change,” project number 100-23-616. 
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